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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL R. LOCHHEAD and 
PENNY LOCHHEAD, 
Plaintiffs/Appellant# 
vs. 
STEPHEN C. JORDAN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 890536 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND CASE HISTORY 
Jurisdiction in this matter is vested in this court 
by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution and 
Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2(3). This is an appeal from an 
Order of the Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial 
District Court of the State of Utah, denying the 
Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate an Order of Dismissal. 
STATFMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Trial Court erred in rewriting the parties' 
contract and refusing to vacate the dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiffs/Appellants, Mr. and Mrs. Lochhead, 
sold property to the Defendant, Jordan. The obligation 
was secured by a Trust Deed. When the secured property 
was sold, Jordan managed to have the property released 
without paying Lochheads, R 2f 21 file C87-35961. The 
balance owed was in excess of $20,000.00. R 154, page 4, 
7. 
Following compliance with the provisions of the 
Utah Trust Deed Statute, a Trustees sale was held on March 
31, 1987. The Trustee's Deed issued on May 27 of the same 
year. On May 28, Case No. C87-3596 was filed seeking a 
deficiency under the Trust Deed Statute. At some point 
thereafter personnel in both the Plaintiffs' and the 
Defendant's counsel's offices became confused on the civil 
numbers and pleadings relating to the 1987 case were filed 
with the 1985 number. The two cases were consolidated by 
an Order of the court dated November 21, 1989. R 36 file 
87-3596. 
Lochheads asked for a deficiency of $20,524.00 
plus attorney's fees and interest at the contractual rate 
of 12.5 percent from June 15, 1984, R2 file C87-3596. The 
accrued interest on the principal as of November 1989, the 
month of the hearing, was $13,896.46 for a total balance 
of principal and interest of $34,420.46. 
All citations to the record are to file number C85-8354 
unless otherwise specified. 
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While the litigation was pending Jordan filed a 
Chapter 13 in Phoenix, Arizona. R 134f 45. Lochheads 
were advised by Jordan1s bankruptcy counsel that the 
allocation of assets based upon the debts listed would pay 
them less than $7,400.00, R 154, pg. 4, R 120, 92, and 
$7,000.00 was offered to resolve the matter. 
After negotiations Lochheads agreed to take 
$8,000.00, R 123. Jordan moved the bankruptcy court to 
authorize the settlement but the motion was denied, R 147, 
133. Thereafter Jordan dismissed the bankruptcy and 
demanded that Lochheads settle on the previous terms, R 
137. Lochheads responded that the $8,000.00 settlement 
offer had been made with the understanding that they would 
receive the money in relatively short order which had not 
occurred, R 105. If they were to settle they would need 
interest at Utah's statutory rate on the settlement 
amount, R 138. Jordan declined and moved to reopen the 
bankruptcy in order to enforce the supposed settlement, R 
113. That Motion was also denied. In that order 
Lochheads learned that Jordan had misrepresented his 
available assets to them, R 147. Further negotiations 
ensued and Lochheads advised Jordan that they would settle 
for $8,000.00 if the sum could be received within ten 
-3-
days, R 139, 118. Lochhead's counsel prepared a 
stipulation and order of dismissal which were given to and 
signed by Jordan's Salt Lake counsel on Jordan's behalf, R 
120f 51, 50. The Third District Court matter had been 
dismissed based upon a Stipulation between the parties as 
part of the settlement R 154 p. 4-6. More than a month 
later Lochheads advised Jordan that the money had not been 
paid and that they were proceeding to reopen the matter in 
the Third District Court, R 140. 
Lochheads moved Third District Court to vacate the 
Order of Dismissal based upon Jordan's failure to comply 
with the terms of the settlement agreement, R 53. Judge 
Brian heard oral argument on the matter and ruled 
essentially that the only thing involved was the 
additional interest claimed by the Lochheads and that they 
should be paid that sum in addition to the $8,000.00 
forthwith. If they were so paid the matter would remain 
dismissed, R 127, R 154 pg. 14. The Lochheads appealed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This matter should be reviewed de novo. 
An executory accord does not produce a satisfaction 
of the underlying agreement unless the terms of the 
accords are met. 
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When parties enter into a contract with specific 
terms the Court may not rewrite that agreement on terms it 
deems to be just. 
A party to a contract is entitled to rely upon 
factual statements made by the other party. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THIS COURT SHOULD EXAMINE THE EVIDENCE 
AND REVIEW DE NOVO. 
Lochheads Motion to Vacate the Order 
of Dismissal was heard pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the 
Code of Judicial Administration. At the hearing the court 
reviewed affidavits describing the history of negotiations 
between the parties. No testimony was taken. In other 
words all the evidence relied upon by the trial court is 
in the record before this court.. All argument was on the 
record. 
This case is in the same posture before the 
Appellate Court as was Bench v. Bechtel Civil & Minerals/ 
Inc., 758 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah App. 1988). There the court 
said, 
"Because the trial court made its 
determination based solely upon Bench's 
deposition, proffers and the pleadings, it 
had no opportunity to evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses. Thus, this Court 
on appellate review, has as good an 
-5-
opportunity as the trial court to examine 
the evidence and may review the facts de 
novo." 
This is an appropriate standard of review because 
there were no findings of fact made by the trial court and 
this court gives no deference to legal conclusions but 
only reviews them for correctness/ Cove View Excavating & 
Const, v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1988). 
II. 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS A CONTRACT 
JORDAN BREACHED. 
The history in the affidavits before the trial court 
shows a lengthy set of negotiations culminated by a letter 
from Lochheads counsel offering to settle the matter on 
specific terms, R. 118, 129. These negotiations and the 
offer to settle should be analyzed in accordance with the 
rules applied to general contract actions. Butcher v. 
Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah App. 1987). 
The language of this offer was specific, 
"The Lochheads had [sic] reconsidered and 
are willing to except [sic] the amount of 
$8,000.00 for settlement of the above matter 
if that amount it [sic] received within the 
next ten (10) days." 
The letter, typographical errors notwithstanding, 
expressed an offer to settle for a specified amount within 
a specified time. The offer was accepted, as admitted by 
-6-
Mr. Jordan's Arizona counsel, R 120/ by requesting a 
dismissal of the action pending in Salt Lake. No request 
was made for an extension of time beyond the 10 days in 
the Lochheads1 August 1 letter. The signed stipulation 
and the order of dismissal were delivered to Jordan's Utah 
counsel was signed by him on August 7. Jordan's Utah counsel's 
name and telephone number appear on Arizona counsel's copy 
of the August 1 letter. 
The terms of the settlement contract were: 
1. Payment of $8,000.00 ; 
2. Within ten days; and 
3. Dismissal of the action. 
Terms one and three were met. Term two was not. 
The court below felt it appropriate to engraft his 
own standard of reason onto this contract some three 
months after it had been reached and breached. The 
transcript of the hearing displays his thinking and 
attitude, R 154, Pgs. 8, 11-23. 
This court has previously held that judicial 
modification of a stated performance time in a contract is 
plain error. In Watson v. Hatch, 728 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 
1986) Justice Durham said, writing for the court: 
"When a contract specifically states the 
time for its performance, it is plain error 
to allow it to be performed within a 
-7-
reasonable time. A court may allow a 
contract to be performed within a reasonable 
time only when the contract is silent as to 
the time for its performance. In Bradford 
v. Alvey & Sons, 621, P.2d 1240, 1242 (Utah 
1980), we stated: "[Wlhen a provision in a 
contract requires an act to be performed 
without specifying the time, the law implies 
that it is to be done within a reasonable 
time under the circumstances.1 The contract 
at issue here is explicit in its time for 
performance and leaves no room for other 
interpretations." 
The language here is as clear as it was in Watson, 
n
. . . if that amount [is! received within the next ten 
(10) days." Despite having been cited to rule of law in 
Watson, R 154 page 13, the trial court chose to reform the 
contract. 
III. 
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT WAS AN EXECUTORY 
ACCORD. 
Lochheads underlying claims against Jordan exceed 
$30,000.00. The negotiations between the parties were 
intended to compromise all claims in exchange for payment 
as an accord and satisfaction. The mere creation of an 
executory accord does not result in satisfaction or 
discharge of the underlying claim. 
The situation here is strikingly similar to that in 
L & A Drywall, Inc. v Whitmore Const. Co., Inc., 608 P.2d 
626, 629 (Utah 1980) where Justice Hall held, 
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"It is true thatf where an alleged breach of 
an agreement or compromise and settlement 
occurs, the aggrieved party need not file a 
separate action to seek judicial relief, but 
may proceed by a simple motion made as a part 
of the original action on the underlying 
dispute. It is likewise true that an 
agreement of compromise and settlement in a 
legal dispute constitutes an executory 
accord. As such, a party to the agreement 
aggrieved by an alleged breach thereof by the 
other party has the option of seeking to 
enforce the settlement agreement, or 
regarding the agreement as rescinded and 
moving against the other party on the 
underlying claim." 
Lochheads clearly opted to rescind the breached executory 
accord and proceed on their original claims for breach of 
the Real Estate Contract. 
Despite having this argument presented to him, R154 
page 17, the trial court maintained that all that was at 
issue was the interest on the amount subject to the 
executory accord. 
IV. 
JORDAN1S MISREPRESENTATION IS SUFFICIENT, 
BY ITSELF, TO VACATE THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
Very early in the negotiations Jordan's Arizona 
counsel represented that Jordan's assets would only support 
a recovery, in the Chapter 13 Bankruptcy of $7,400.00, R 
92-93. A year and a half later the Arizona Bankruptcy 
Court denied Jordan's motion to reinstate his Bankruptcy 
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because of the existence of "substantial additional assets" 
R 146-147. 
When the issue of misrepresentation was raised with 
the trial court, R 154 pg. 18, he responded that Lochheads 
had a duty to investigate Jordan's counsel's 
representation, R 154 pg. 18. 
The trial court's position on this point is directly 
in conflict with Utah Law. In Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 
1239, 1247 (Utah 1980) this court held that one party had 
no duty to investigate the facts surrounding a 
representation by another party as to the extent of his 
assets, see also Christenson v. Com. Land Title 
Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 307 (Utah 1983). In this case the 
representations were the sworn statements of the debtor, 
Jordan, in his bankruptcy schedules. 
Even if the settlement agreement were not an 
executory accord Jordan's misrepresentation is sufficient 
to rescind the agreement and vacate the dismissal. 
V. 
RULE 60 REQUIRES THAT THE ORDER 
OF DISMISSAL BE VACATED. 
The trial court's order denying Lochheads Motion to 
Vacate the Order of Dismissal is a final appealable order, 
Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 
17 (Utah App. 89). 
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Rule 60(b) contains seven sub parts. Jordan's 
actions require the court to consider subparts 3 and 7. 
Part 3 authorizes the vacation of the order for 
fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct of the adverse 
party. Jordan's representation as to his assets subject to 
the Chapter 13 require vacation of the order since the 
settlement agreement upon which the order was based was 
based on that misrepresentation. Additionally, Jordan's 
failure to follow through with the terms of the settlement 
agreement is a breach of that agreement constituting 
misconduct by a party. 
In the event the court determines that Jordan's 
actions do not meet the criteria of Rule 60(b)(3), Rule 
60(b)(7) requires that the order be vacated. The case was 
dismissed in reliance upon Jordan's performance which did 
not occur. 
In Robinson v. Myers, 599 P.2d 513f 515 (Utah 1979) 
this court suggested that on a Rule 60(b) motion the 
appropriate inquiry is why a party failed to respond. In 
this case the reason is that the opposing party breached a 
contract. The consideration for that contract was the 
dismissal of this case. Having breached he is not entitled 
to retain his consideration/ dismissal of the suit. 
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In Haner v. Haner/ 373 P.2d 577/ 578 (Utah 1962) this 
court described the rule for considering Rule 60(b) 
motions: 
"It seems more realistic to say that when it 
appears that the processes of justice have 
been so completely thwarted or distorted as 
to persuade the court that in fairness and 
good conscience the judgment should not be 
permitted to stand/ relief should be 
granted." 
By the Haner standard the dismissal below should be 
vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
The preamble to Rule 60(b) refers to its purpose 
". . . in the furtherance of justice . . . .n The record 
shows that Jordan evaded Lochheads security interest and 
breached his contract with them. He failed to respond or 
appear when the trust deed was foreclosed. Once he was 
served he evaded the issues. When the matter was pressed 
he filed bankruptcy. From within bankruptcy he attempted 
to negotiate a settlement which the court would not let him 
keep. 
Literally years after Jordan commenced his 
shenanigans the Lochheads said/ one last time/ we will 
settle this matter if you settle it now. Jordan failed to 
meet the terms of this agreement/ as he had with past 
-12-
agreements, and the Lochheads said enough is enough. They 
are entitled to pursue their initial claim and this court 
should direct the trial court to allow them to do so. 
DATED this / L> day of February, 1990. 
Attorney for Appellants 
ATTACHMENTS 
Minute Entry of November 16, 1989 
Order of November 22, 1989 
Transcript of Hearing 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to be deposited in 
the United States Mailf postage prepaid, to: 
Frederick N. Green 
GREEN & BERRY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
10 Exchange Place, Suite 528 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
on this / (f day of February, 1990. 
ROBERT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOCHHEAD, PAUL R 
V5 
JORDAN, STEPHEN C 
PLAINTIFF 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. ROBERT H. WILDE 
D. ATTY. FREDERICK N. GREEN 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 850908354 CV 
DATE 11/16/89 
HONORABLE PAT B BRIAN 
COURT REPORTER BRAD YOUNG 
COURT CLERK EHM 
THIS MATTER COMES NOW BEFORE THE COURT FOR HEARING ON PLAINTIFFS 
MOTION TO VACATE. APPEARANCES AS SHOWN ABOVE. MOTION IS ARGUED 
AND SUBMITTED TO THE COURT. THE COURT RULES AS FOLLOWS: 
MOTION TO VACATE IS DENIED. COURT ORDERS COUNSEL FOR THE 
DEFENDANT TO OBTAIN $8,000.00 ON OR BEFORE NOVEMBER 20, 
1989 @5:00 P.M. COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT WILL HAND CARRY 
THE CHECK TO COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
INTEREST WII.L BE CALCULATED AT THE LEGAL RATE FROM AUGUST 
10, 1989 THHU OCTOBER 20, 1989. CHECK FOR THE INTEREST 
SHOULD BE HAND DELIVERED BY COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT TO 
COUNSEL FOR THE PLAINTIFF BY NOVEMBER 20, 1989 @ 5:00 P.M. 
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT WILL PREPARE THE ORDER BY 11-22-89. 
-w t ' \ GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN (124 0) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
528 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-5650 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NOV 2 2 1939 
PAUL R. LOCHHEAD and 
PENNY LOCHHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STEPHEN C. JORDAN, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No, C85-8354 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Judge Pat B. Brian, on the 16th day 
of November, 1989, the parties being represented by their counsel 
of record, and the matter having been argued and submitted to the 
Court for decision, and good cause otherwise appearing it is, 
hereby, 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, as follows: 
1. That Plaintiffs1 Motion to Vacate Order is, and is 
hereby, denied. 
2. That Defendant shall, through his counsel of record, 
cause to be hand delivered to Plaintiffs1 counsel, the following: 
(a) A check in the amount of $8000 payable to the 
Plaintiffs; and 
(b) A check representing legal interest from August 10 
until November 20, 1989 in the amount of $268.26. 
3. That both checks referred to above shall be certified 
and shall be delivered no later than 5:00 p.m. November 20, 1989. 
4. That Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare this 
Order and submit it to the Court no later than 12:00 noon, 
November 22,-1989. m 
DATED THIS a£. 
1989 
day of ^ •?- > / 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE PAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
/I tfjDVGiStcf &} ^ ^ 
/!/L 
l/Ml 
^\ n r* * * f~\ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
) C 0 U N TW»T 
Audrea E>?—Bueno, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of GREEN & BERRY, 
attorneys for Defendant herein, that she served the attached 
Order upon the following parties by placing a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Robert H. Wilde, Esq 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Cook & Wilde 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
and depositing the same, sealed, with first class postage prepaid 
therein, in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah on the 
S7J) 
^^ day of November, 1989. 
4 ^ ^ - d > 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
November, 1989. 
My Commission Expires: 
10 day of 
rPubfio 
JUUEfiURTON 1 53 NatounBfe 10 Exchange 1 
3ait Lake City, Utah »41i1 \ 
My Commission 
February 9,1 
State of Utah 
^JS^vCT 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah 
" W **w <** ..«• 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* • 
PAUL R. LOCHHEAD and 
PENNY LOCHHEAD, 
Plaintiffs, 
-ve-
STEPHEN C. JORDAN, 
Defendant. 
Case No. C85-8354 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
* • * 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
November 16, 1989 
* * * 
For the Plaintiffs: 
For the Defendant: 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
Robert H. Wilde 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Frederick N. Green 
528 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
BRAD J. YOUNG 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
1 I P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 J THE COURT: Paul R. Lochhead and Penny Lochhead vs. 
3 Stephen Jordan, C85-8354. Counsel will state an appearance. 
4 MR. WILDE: Robert Wilde for the plaintiffs, your 
5 Honor. 
6 MR. GREEN: Frederick N. Green appearing for the 
7 defendant. 
8 THE COURT: To begin the hearing, the Court is going 
9 to read a letter dated October 2, authored by Mr. Green, to 
10 the judge of this court. "The plaintiffs have brought a 
11 motion to vacate an order, based upon a stipulation of the 
12 parties. Because the motion did not cite its compliance to 
13 rule 4-501, nor apparently contain a memorandum in support 
14 thereof, the defendants objected. The objection was in reply 
15 to the motion. The plaintiffs have since replied to the 
16 objection and filed a notice to submit and proposed order. 
17 The defendant objects to this and the objection is enclosed. 
18 As you can see, this Is all very confusing. I would suggest 
19 the entire matter be scheduled for oral argument so we can 
20 sort this out and see where everybody stands prior to any more 
21 memoranda being filed. Sincerely, Frederick N. Green." 
22 The Court has two questions. Was a motion to vacate 
23 agreed upon by the parties? 
24 I MR. GREEN: There has been no stipulation to vacate 
25 the order, your Honor. 
1 MR. WILDE: No, there has been no agreement to 
2 vacate. 
3 THE COURT: The plaintiffs have brought a motion to 
4 vacate an order based on a stipulation of the parties. What 
5 was the stipulation? 
6 MR. GREEN: That's confusing. The stipulation was 
7 to settle the case. Based upon that stipulation an order of 
8 dismissal was entered. They have now brought a motion to 
9 vacate the order of dismissal. There Is no stipulation to 
10 vacate that order. 
11 I MR. WILDE: I don't believe that the letter 
12 correctly states the status of the case. 
13 THE COURT: Somebody ought to explain to the Court 
14 what18 going on. 
15 I MR. WILDE: Perhaps I could do that. The Court, on 
16 the phone yesterday, Indicated that It would be willing to 
17 consider whatever additional Information we wished to provide. 
18 I If I may approach the bench. 
19 THE COURT: You may. 
20 MR. WILDE: I prepared an affidavit, which covers 
21 correspondence between myself and my counterpart in Arizona, 
22 and also the attorney who was employed by my client In Arizona 
23 In the bankruptcy. Also, we have included — provided the 
24 Court a copy of the order of September 1, 1989, In the 
26 bankruptcy in Arizona, denying the motion to reopen the 
1 bankruptcy, and a copy of the case of Watson vs. Hatch. 
2 Essentially, what happened in this case, my clients 
3 have a claim against the defendant, dating back to I believe 
4 about 1985, 1986, in the amount of $23,000, for a deficiency 
5 on a trust deed note. The defendant managed to get the 
6 property that that note secured released, without paying it, 
7 and declined to pay thereafter, and we filed suit. Litigation 
8 ensued. Mr. Jordan moved to Arizona and filed a chapter 13. 
9 The Court will look at the first exhibit of the 
10 affidavit, that's a letter from Mr. Newdelmon, who is 
11 Mr. Jordan's attorney in Arizona, and there he states that the 
12 $8,000 offer he is making is more than my clients are going to 
13 be able to get out of the chapter 13 bankruptcy. And based 
14 upon those representations, settlement negotiations got 
15 underway. 
16 This offer, as the Court can see, was made in April 
17 of 1988. Negotiations continued, and sometime, my 
18 understanding, is in the summer of 1988 there was an 
19 acceptance by my client of the offer to settle for $8,000, 
20 understanding on my client's part the sum would be paid in 
21 fairly short order. 
22 Exhibit 2 is a letter that I wrote back to 
23 Mr. Hendricksen, and discussed the fact that we talked about 
24 getting this $8,000, and we thought we were going to get it 
25 fairly quickly. Notice, this letter is in February of 1989. 
1 We are looking eight or nine months later. We agree that we 
2 had agreed at that particular time to do that. 
3 Exhibit 3, however, Is a letter from Mr. Hendrlcksen 
4 back to me, saying that the proposal had been submitted to the 
5 bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court, who had 
6 Mr. Jordan*s bankruptcy before It, his chapter 13, had 
7 declined to allow that settlement to be made. It seems to us 
8 fairly clear that at that point In time there was no more 
9 settlement, because the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over 
10 Mr. Jordan and they declined to allow him to settle In that 
11 fashion. 
12 Look over to Exhibit 4, that's a letter from 
13 I Mr. Newdelmon, the defendant's Arizona counsel, back to me. 
14 They still want to go through with the matter, and they want 
15 us to settle it for the $8,000. 
16 Exhibit 5, we said no, we don't think that is fair. 
17 We want Interest. We understood we were going to be able to 
18 settle, get the money fairly quickly. That has happened, so 
19 we are going to settle for $800, which is statutory 10-percent 
20 interest on the $8,000. 
21 Exhibit 6 is a letter back to me. 
22 Exhibit 7, these two letters essentially show that 
23 we continued to dicker, to continue to negotiate the matter. 
24 Exhibit 8 is my letter to Mr. Newdelmon of August 1. 
25 I think this is probably the important letter. There I say to 
1 I Mr. Newdelman, "The Lochheads have reconsidered and are 
2 willing to accept the amount of $8,000 for settlement of the 
3 above matter if that amount is received within the next ten 
4 days." That language is specific. It constitutes probably 
5 full 20 percent of the entire contents of the letter. We 
6 said, yes, we will settle for $8,000 if we can get it within 
7 the next ten days. 
8 We then prepared the stipulation and order of 
9 dismissal, submitted them to Mr. Green before August 10, and 
10 Mr. Green endorsed them. They were then submitted to the 
11 Court. Exhibit 9 is our letter back to Mr. Newdelman 
12 September 6, almost a month later, saying, We told you on 
13 August 1 we are willing to settle If we can get the money 
14 within ten days. The money hasn't come. Obviously, the offer 
15 is withdrawn. 
16 Exhibit 10 is his letter back to me, where he 
17 acknowledges that, yes, there was a deal for $8,000. No, you 
18 don't have it. He says the cashier's check was available and 
19 whatever. There Is no correspondence. I had no information 
20 whatsoever that he needed to have the signed dismissal In his 
21 office in Arizona. I am not certain what good that would do, 
22 because Mr. Jordan has counsel here In Utah, Mr. Green, who 
23 signed the stipulation, and the dismissal needs to be filed 
24 here. 
25 That's exactly what happened, and that's how the 
case got dismissed, and we are back here today, and we filed 
our motion to vacate on the grounds that we dismissed this 
action based upon the assumption that they were going to 
comply with the offer we had made to them. The offer was we 
will be paid $8,000 within ten days. That did not happen. I 
note that they were not out anxiously knocking at our door. 
I would comment to the Court that a fair amount of 
the correspondence between Mr. Newdelman and myself has been 
telefaxed to my office by Mr. Newdelman. Notably, the 
assertion that we have to have the dismissal sent to my 
office, all of those things, no correspondence whatsoever. 
All we have Is an affidavit from Mr. Newdelman18 secretary, 
saying she spoke with my secretary. He have a counter-
affidavit from my secretary, saying the affidavit she states, 
It Is not how things were. 
THE COURT: The question the Court has to ask — and 
excuse the Court If the question Is impertinent. Are counsel 
and the parties willing to do all of this for $800? 
MR. WILDE: He don't see that $800 is the Issue, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: What is the issue? 
MR. WILDE: The issue is $23,000 plus Interest at 
10 percent since 1985. 
THE COURT: You have agreed, have you not, to 
dismiss the case in receipt of $8,000? 
7 
1 I MR. WILDE: He agreed to dismiss the case in receipt 
2 of $8,000 if it was paid within ten days. That's the 
3 reason — 
4 THE COURT: Just a moment. Your agreement at one 
5 time, knowing everything that apparently you thought was 
6 necessary to know about the case, you agreed to dismiss it for 
7 $8,000; is that correct? 
8 MR. WILDE: At that time. That's the reason we 
9 provided the Court the copy of the order from bankruptcy 
10 court. 
11 THE COURT: As recent as August 1 of 1989, you were 
12 still willing, in light of all of the information you had 
13 about the case, to dismiss It for $8,000; Is that correct? 
14 MR. WILDE: If it was received within ten days. 
15 THE COURT: Apparently, all the Court can do is just 
16 read the correspondence, and assume that there was a 
17 reasonable difference of opinion on what should come first, 
18 the money or the dismissal. Traditionally, those matters are 
19 exchanged simultaneously. If a settlement occurs, the moving 
20 party agrees to dismiss, there is a dismissal order filed, the 
21 money is paid, dismissal order is recorded, and it is over. 
22 The Court notes that in September, less than 30 days after you 
23 wrote your letter, the money was deposited In a form of a 
24 cashier's check, and the only reason that the money was not 
25 tendered is because the party was waiting for an order of 
dismissal. 
Now, if that'8 all this lawsuit is about, why don't 
you sit down and resolve it? 
MR. WILDE: May I respond? 
THE COURT: The Court would be very interested in 
your response. 
MR. WILDE: First of all, the reason that we have 
provided the Court with the order from the bankruptcy court is 
because that order Indicates that the information we had was 
not the correct information. 
THE COURT: Counsel, whose responsibility is that? 
MR. WILDE: If they are going to mislead us. It Is 
their responsibility. 
THE COURT: Isn't your responsibility to exercise 
due diligence when you negotiate In behalf of a client, and 
say, You tell us we are only going to get $8,000 out of this 
case. The truth of the matter is we might get $80,000. Whose 
responsibility is that? In the negotiation process doesn't 
that occur every day in this city and in every city in the 
United States? 
A. I think that misses the point. The point is 
Mr. Jordan had stated under oath, in the bankruptcy court in 
Arizona, what his assets were. The bankruptcy court In 
Arizona finds in Its order that the schedules reflect 
substantial additional assets. 
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THE COURT: What date is that order? 
MR. WILDE: September 1 of 1989. 
THE COURT: Are you saying that you now would not 
have sent your letter of August 1, had you known that 
information? 
MR. WILDE: That's exactly what I am saying. 
THE COURT: What was available to you, through the 
bankruptcy court, prior to August 1, in terms of verifying or 
disaffirming representations of opposing counsel and his 
client? 
MR. WILDE: What was available to us was available 
through Mr. Hendrlcksen. The correspondence in this file 
indicates numerous amounts of information. I believe there 
is, under cover of an affidavit from Mr. Newdelman, a copy of 
a letter back to me, where he acknowledges that the 
representation that Mr. Lochhead had from Mr. Hendrlcksen in 
Arizona was less than effective, and that Mr. Hendrlcksen was 
not doing anything to further his interest. I believe the 
point, however, Is completely resolved by the case of Watson 
vs. Hatch, because in order to reach the point that I see the 
Court going at this point in time — 
THE COURT: The Court is not going in any direction, 
The Court is asking some very relevant questions, to clarify 
in the Court's mind the history of the case. 
MR. WILDE: Fine. Letfs talk about the history of 
10 
the case -
will take 
check? 
received 1 
as It relates to the August-September time frame. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
WILDE: 
$8,000 If 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
WILDE: 
That18 a good starting point. 
We have a letter to them, which says we 
the check can be received within ten days. 
What was the date of the cashier's 
I don't know. The point Is, it was not 
by us nor was It tendered to us. 
THE COURT: 
point. Was there a 
the cashier's 
September 
check? 
Certainly 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
• 
THE 
MR. 
, It 
THE 
only dispute i 
have been 
the Court 
analysis. 
check 
WILDE: 
COURT: 
WILDE: 
COURT: 
WILDE: 
The Court isn't sure that isn't the 
cashier'8 check drawn, and did the date on 
comply with your ten-day demand? 
They say that it does. 
Have you checked it out? 
It was not tendered to us until 
Have you looked at the date on the 
I have looked at the date on the check. 
was drawn within that time period. 
COURT: Then it appears to the Court that the 
existing between the parties is, should the check 
given before the order of dismissal was filed? Is 
incorrect 
MR. WILDE: 
in its analysis? 
I believe the Court Is incorrect In its 
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1 THE COURT: Then the Court would like to have you 
2 point out where the Court's reasoning is Incorrect. 
3 MR. WILDE: The reason the reasoning is incorrect is 
4 because if we use the Court's analysis that we need to provide 
5 them the dismissal before we get the check, we provided them a 
6 dismissal on the 7th of August, through Mr. Green, their 
7 counsel, the person who represents them in this court, where 
8 the case must be dismissed. So it is fair to assume, based 
9 upon the fact Mr. Newdelman's affidavits and correspondence 
10 have been Introduced in this case, through Mr. Green, and 
11 I Mr. Green and Mr. Newdelman have some sort of communication 
12 I relating to their common client — 
13 THE COURT: Based on the history of this case, the 
14 Court is not sure that's a fair assumption. 
15 I MR. NILDE: I don't think I want, necessarily, to 
16 get into the quality of representation or the missed messages 
17 on either end of this arrangement. However, it is a fact that 
18 on the 7th of August, we provided to Mr. Green, in Salt Lake 
19 City, for his client, the stipulation and the order. The 
20 stipulation and the order were entered here. 
21 THE COURT: And filed. And the case was dismissed. 
22 What did you do from that day forward? 
23 I MR. WILDE: We waited for the money. 
24 THE COURT: Did you contact counsel and ask where 
26 the check was? 
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1 MR. WILDE: Ho. 
2 J THE COURT: Why not? 
3 I MR. WILDE: Frankly, I had a number of other matters 
4 In the office, and then I did contact counsel, I contacted 
5 1 Mr. Hewdelman, who I understood to be the man who had the 
6 check. I contacted him, and that Is the letter which serves 
7 as Exhibit 9, my letter to him of September 6, which says, You 
8 were supposed to get us a check within ten days. We don't 
9 have the check. The case has been dismissed. It was done 
10 within the time frame. 
11 THE COURT: Did you pick up the telephone and call 
12 Salt Lake counsel and say, Where Is that $8,000? 
13 I MR. WILDE: No. 
14 THE COURT: Why not? 
15 MR. WILDE: My understanding that the check, If It 
16 were to come, was going to be coming from Arizona. All of the 
17 affidavits, all of the correspondence filed In this action, 
18 Indicated that Is correct and that la the case. I think the 
19 case turns on Watson vs. Hatch, which says that the Court may 
20 not read Into a contract between parties a reasonable time for 
21 performance where there Is a specific time for performance set 
22 In the contract. That's exactly what happened here. 
23 THE COURT: The Court agrees with you. Counsel, 
24 except It appears to the Court that performance was In fact 
25 compiled with when the certified check was drawn within the 
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1 ten days that you demanded. And a simple phone call would 
2 have obtained the check, and another $1,000 or $1,500 In legal 
3 fees and court costs and all of the problems that have 
4 subsequently arisen would have been eliminated. 
5 The Court Is miffed, frankly, that legal disputes 
6 digress to this level of whatever you want to call It. If the 
7 parties had agreed to a disposition, and at least the 
8 compliance was threshold compliance, you want your money, the 
9 check Is drawn, they say the check was not tendered because 
10 they didn't have the notice of dismissal, It appears to the 
11 Court that reasonable people would have picked up the phone 
12 and said, Look, we filed the dismissal. Where Is our money? 
13 And the person on the other side would say, I drew that check 
14 within the ten-day period of time. It Is a certified check. 
15 All I want la a copy of the dismissal. And counsel would have 
16 said, Fax It to me, or send It overnight, certified mall, 
17 return receipt requested, and the matter would have been 
18 resolved. 
19 Maybe the Court Is just a little bit too practical 
20 In its approach. That's just exactly the way the Court sees 
21 I it. Now we are back in court, it has been — we are going on 
22 five months, and, basically, what we are talking about Is $800 
23 in disputed Interest. That $800 has been consumed two or 
24 three times. Where Is the certified check today? 
25 MR. GREEN: It is in Arizona, your Honor. Counsel 
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1 retains It down there, Mr. Newdelman, but It could be 
2 transferred overnight mall very easily. 
3 THE COURT: Goodness sakes, I just don't know, you 
4 know, If you were arguing about the fact that there had been a 
5 major noncompliance with this agreement, the Court can 
6 understand you going back to square one and starting over. 
7 But, as the Court reads the correspondence between counsel, 
8 there Is a letter dated August 1 that says the plaintiffs have 
9 reconsidered and are willing to accept the amount of $8,000 
10 for settlement of the above matter, If the amount Is received 
11 within the next ten days. The check should be made payable 
12 J solely to the Lochheads. According to your own 
13 representation, a certified check was drawn within the ten-day 
14 period, that amount of money, and the response back Is, We 
15 want a copy of the dismissal. When we receive the copy of the 
16 dismissal, you can get your check. I don't know why a couple 
17 I of phone calls werenft made and that whole business taken care 
18 of. 
19 I MR. WILDE: May I respond? 
20 THE COURT: Please. 
21 MR. WILDE: Thank you. First of all, the letter of 
22 August 1 does not say provide us evidence that you have an 
23 $8,000 check. It says If the check Is received, received 
24 meaning received by us. We did what was necessary in order to 
25 accomplish those things which were required. We provided the 
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1 stipulation and the dismissal to Salt Lake counsel, who were 
2 the only people who could have anything to do with it, since 
3 Mr. Newdelman, to my understanding, is not licensed to 
4 practice in the State of Utah. 
6 THE COURT: When you did that, did you ask Salt Lake 
6 counsel for the $8,000 check? 
7 I MR. WILDE: No. We understood the check was to be 
8 coming from Arizona. 
9 THE COURT: When it didn't come, did you ask Salt 
10 Lake counsel to follow up and get you your $8,000 check? 
11 I MR. WILDE: Mo. We understood it was to be coming 
12 from Arizona. 
13 Secondly, if the Court will examine the history of 
14 the relationship in these — between these parties, as I 
15 indicated to the Court yesterday in the telephone conference, 
16 this has been a long history of what we consider to be 
17 dilatory tactics by Mr. Jordan, and his Arizona counsel and 
18 his prior counsel. 
19 THE COURT: It may well be true, exactly what you 
20 say, everything may be true. At some point in time you were 
21 willing to overlook that. As recent as August 1 you said, We 
22 have reconsidered, and we are now willing to take it. 
23 Irrespective of what may have run under the bridge prior to 
24 August l, you were willing to overlook it for $8,000. 
25 I MR. WILDE: For $8,000 and no more dilatory tactics, 
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for prompt payment. Additionally, we see this as a matter 
that is accord and satisfaction. He have said we are willing 
to resolve all of these past problems for the payment of 
$8,000 timely made. My understanding of the law of accord and 
satisfaction is if the accord is not satisfied, then the 
claiming party may either sue on the accord and satisfaction 
or may Ignore the accord and satisfaction and go back to the 
original obligation, which is exactly what we have chosen to 
do. 
THE C00RT: Technically, you may be correct. The 
Court views it in Just a little bit different light. The 
Court believes that in all of the bump and grind of the 
profession, there ought to be, someplace conspicuously visible 
to everyone, some good judgment and common sense. The Court 
believes that that ought to be common with everyone. What has 
happened to what we call good judgment and common sense? 
If the dismissal were tendered, as you say it was, 
one phone call would have indicated that the check was not in 
Salt Lake. Counsel in Salt Lake would have made a telephone 
call. The check would have been sent. The matter would have 
been resolved. If after demand it was not sent, then you have 
nonperformance. But to have two counsel, who are representing 
the same client, not let the left hand know what the right 
hand Is doing, and then use that as some basis to unwind an 
agreement that was perfectly acceptable to you before, doesn't 
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1 make a lot of sense to the Court. 
2 1 MR. WILDE: Your Honor, again, the other point here 
3 is that the acceptable agreement was made before we were aware 
4 that the representations we had received from Mr. Jordan, 
5 based on the findings of the bankruptcy court, were apparently 
6 inadequate or in error or misrepresented or whatever. 
7 THE COURT: Counsel, the Court understands that. 
8 The Court understands precisely what you are saying. Whose 
9 responsibility is it to check out that kind of information? 
10 You certainly believed that opposing counsel is going to 
11 advance his client's cause in his client*8 best interest. He 
12 is going to tell you, whether it Is factual or actual, that he 
13 believes if you go through a proceeding you are not going to 
14 get $8,000 out of the bankruptcy court, anyway. Thatfs his 
15 opinion. If you have a differing opinion on that, then you 
16 ought to check it out. 
17 I MR. WILDE: We perceived this rather to be a matter 
18 of factual misrepresentation by Mr. Jordan. Anyway, suffice 
19 it to say, I believe we have presented the Court with our 
20 arguments, and we will submit the matter. 
21 THE COURT: Anything further? 
22 MR. GREEN: Just very briefly, your Honor. Three 
23 main points. Mr. Wilde says he is not aware of the 
24 requirement of Mr. Newdelman, the Phoenix lawyer — 
25 THE COURT: Let the Court bring you right to the 
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point on your argument. What does fairness In this situation 
dictate. In terms of Interest from the date the check was 
drawn and not delivered, or In terms of compensating, If you 
will, for expenses that may have been incurred In trying to 
get the check? As long as the Court Is focused this morning 
on what Is a reasonable approach to the resolution of the 
problem, why don't you tell the Court what you think would be 
fair and appropriate In terms of compensating the defendant 
for $8,000 that he agreed to receive and hasn't received since 
August. 
MR. GREEN: I believe what would be fair is for him 
to receive that $8,000 as quickly as possible. 
THE COURT: What else? 
MR. GREEN: I believe it would be reasonable and I 
dare say for the defendant to be reimbursed for his costs 
incurred in defending this motion to vacate. That's where I 
need to get into some of the reasons for that. 
THE COURT: What about the plaintiff being given the 
legal rate of Interest on his money? If the check had been In 
the bank he would have been earning interest on the $8,000 
since the 10th of August, would he not? It is now the middle 
of November. 
MR. GREEN: Two points. The defendant didn't earn 
Interest on that money. That's in that cashier's check. 
Point number two, we tendered those funds pursuant to the 
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1 tender statute late In September. Number three. It has been 
2 available for the plaintiff all along, and we ought not to be 
3 punished because of what they have done, delaying that 
4 delivery of the funds. The defendant has been punished quite 
5 enough, I assure you, with the expense and inconvenience of 
6 this litigation. 
7 THE COURT: You may proceed. 
8 MR. GREEN: Regarding the requirement of the 
9 defendant's counsel in Phoenix that he receive an order of 
10 dismissal, I have just reviewed the file, probably as briefly 
11 I as the Court has, but May 24 of 1989, Mr. Newdelman says, We 
12 will pay the $8,000. The only requirement which I impose 
13 would be a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and a 
14 mutual release. Prior to that, he says, this Is February 6 of 
15 1989, "You will need to obtain for me either a satisfaction of 
16 judgment or a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice. In 
17 turn, I will prepare a mutual release.M 
18 THE COURT: The Court assumes that all of that stuff 
19 was resolved between the parties as of August 1, 1989. 
20 MR. GREEN: I believe that's correct. 
21 THE COURT: Let's go from August 1. 
22 MR. GREEN: From August 1, it is significant that 
23 the stipulation and the order say nothing about ten days. 
24 That's what I signed. They rely upon contract law. Where is 
25 the contract? It is a letter from Mr. Wilde, saying, We want 
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1 it in ten days; in response to which there is a letter from 
2 Newdelman saying, You will get it when we get the dismissal. 
3 I signed the stipulation. That!s all I do at this point. I 
4 haven't represented him effectively since the bankruptcy was 
5 filed two years ago. 
6 THE COURT: The Court is aware of that. The Court 
7 understands that there has been some confusion. And the Court 
8 Is of the opinion that the confusion can be distributed 
9 equally to all counsel and parties. 
10 MR. GREEN: That's one reason I am telling you that. 
11 I didn't know anything about ten days at any time. I was not 
12 copied on the letter to Mr. Newdelman. 
13 THE COURT: Did you receive a copy of the dismissal? 
14 MR. GREEN: No. No. I signed the stipulation. 
15 That's all I got. I signed approving as to form on the 
16 dismissal. 
17 THE COURT: At least you knew there was a 
18 dismissal — 
19 MR. GREEN: Absolutely. 
20 THE COURT: What did you do about giving up the 
21 $8,000 after you — 
2 2 MR. GREEN: I didn't have $8,000. I didnft know 
23 what the terras were they had arranged to make payment. A 
24 phone call, granted, from Mr. Wilde or Mr. Newdelman would 
25 have solved that problem. If I may approach the bench with 
21 
tender statute late in September. Number three, it has been 
available for the plaintiff all along, and we ought not: to be 
punished because of what they have done, delaying that 
delivery of the funds. The defendant has been punished quite 
enough, I assure you, with the expense and inconvenience of 
this litigation. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. GREEN: Regarding the requirement of the 
defendants counsel in Phoenix that he receive an order of 
dismissal, I have just reviewed the file, probably as briefly 
as the Court has, but May 24 of 1989, Mr. Newdelman says, We 
will pay the $8,000. The only requirement which I impose 
would be a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and a 
mutual release. Prior to that, he says, this is February 6 of 
1989, "You will need to obtain for me either a satisfaction of 
judgment or a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice. In 
turn, I will prepare a mutual release." 
THE COURT: The Court assumes that all of that stuff 
was resolved between the parties as of August 1, 1989. 
MR. GREEN: I believe that's correct. 
THE COURT: Let's go from August 1. 
MR. GREEN: From August 1, it is significant that 
the stipulation and the order say nothing about ten days. 
That's what I signed. They rely upon contract law. Where is 
the contract? It is a letter from Mr. Wilde, saying, We want 
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1 we offered them the money, and September 7 Mr, Newdelman sent 
2 him a letter, in response to the September 6 letter from 
3 Mr. Wilde, saying the money is here. We will send it, if we 
4 have the dismissal. By that time he had received, just a day 
5 before, the withdrawal of the settlement. I suppose what 
6 would be fair would be to put one month's interest on there. 
7 There was no confusion as of September 7. We knew right where 
8 we stood. Interest ought not to be tacked on. Since 
9 September 6 or 7, at least this matter could have been 
10 resolved, defendants were willing to resolve it, and we are 
11 here on the plaintiff's motion, and I think the Court has 
12 correctly analyzed that. The other point I would make is the 
13 business about the misrepresentation. 
14 THE COURT: Is that really necessary to argue, based 
15 on what the Court has indicated its assessment of the case? 
16 MR. GREEN: I don't believe so, and I don't believe 
17 it is before the Court. I would submit it on that basis, 
18 THE COURT: Both parties submit? 
19 MR. WILDE: We will submit it, your Honor, 
20 THE COURT: What is the motion before the Court? 
21 MR. WILDE: The motion before the Court is to vacate 
22 the dismissal which was previously entered. 
23 THE COURT: Any other motions? 
24 MR. GREEN: None, your Honor. 
25 THE COURT: Both counsel submit on all motions 
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some additional authority, which I think you will find 
supports the Court's point of view. 
Contrary to what Counsel says about accord and 
satisfaction, the Court has ruled twice now. It is the same 
policy. These cases involve the enforcement of a settlement 
agreement. It is the same policy that governs here, where one 
party seeks to avoid a settlement agreement, and vacate an 
order. The Court has ruled. And I am referring to the Tracy 
case, the parties trying to avoid the settlement claimed that 
counsel for the other party had not timely filed some 
documents that were necessary for the settlement. 
The Court rules at the very end, the summary 
procedure is admirably suited to situations where, for 
example, a binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown, 
which we have here, and the excuse for nonperformance,is 
comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is ill-
suited to situations presenting complex factual situations. 
If anything, Tracy is much more complex than the case we have 
here. The case we have here says, what came first? Should we 
deliver the $8,000 or get the dismissal? 
THE COURT: The Court is comfortable with its 
assessment of the law, at this posture of the argument. 
MR. GREEN: The only thing I would add, your Honor, 
two points. In terms of fairness, it is my honest opinion 
that the defendant has been penalized enough, especially where 
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1 before the Court? 
2 MR. GREEN: Correct, your Honor. 
3 MR. WILDE: We do, 
4 THE COURT: The motion to vacate is denied. The 
5 Court orders, as part of that denial, that counsel for the 
6 defendant obtain $8,000 in certified funds on or before 
7 5:00 p.m., November 20, that that money, in certified funds, 
8 be hand carried to counsel for the plaintiff. The Court 
9 further orders that interest be calculated from August 10 to 
10 November 20 at the legal rate, and that a certified check, 
11 including interest at the legal rate for that period of time, 
12 also be tendered to counsel for the plaintiff on or before 
13 November 20, 1989, 5:00 p.m. The Court orders that counsel 
14 for the defendant prepare an appropriate order, consistent 
15 with the ruling of the Court. That order is to be submitted 
16 to the Court on or before November 22, 1989, at 12 noon, for 
17 signing and filing with the clerk. Is there anything further? 
18 MR. WILDE: We don't have anything, your Honor. 
19 MR. GREEN: Nothing, your Honor. Thank you. 
20 J (Court was in recess.) 
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